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IN THE

SUPRF~lE

COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UT.Z\H, in the interest of:
J.

c.

p.'

Case No. 15130
a person under eighteen
years of age.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a case in which the Juvenile Court found John
Payne, a minor, guilty of obstructing a police officer in the
performance of his duty.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Juvenile Court found the allegations contained in
the petition to be true.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have this court affirm the verdict
of the Juvenile Court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Respondent finds no specific error in the Statement
of Facts ser. forth in appellant's brief.

However, respondent

feels that the emphasis placed by appellant on certain of
the facts, and omissions therefrom, gives a distorted impres-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

sion of the true circUIT1stances, and for that reason was
its own abbreviated statement of the facts as follows:
On New Year's Eve, December 31, 1976, Officer Willis
Pidcock, a patrolman for Ogden City, was in uniform and
on duty.

(R. 2) . He was sitting in his patrol car and observe,

Officer Bowcutt, likewise an Ogden policeman and

likewi~e

uniform, attempting to impound another vehicle.

(R. 2). Of-

in

ficer Bowcutt was discussing the impound with a Scott Payne.
A scuffle ensued between Officer Bowcutt and said Scott Payne
and Officer Bowcutt hollered to Officer Pidcock for assistance.

(R. 2).

As Officer Pidcock ran to help he observed

that Officer Bowcutt had hold of the suspect around the shoul·
ders and back,and the suspect was striking Officer Bowcutt
in the side and the side of the head.

As Officer Pidcock

entered the fray he was likewise struck three times by the
suspect.

(R. 2).

The two officers subdued the suspect and

were moving with him toward the impound wrecker, when John
Payne came up from the left side of Officer Pidcock, grabbed
Officer Pidcock and caused him to release his grasp on the
suspect' s arm.

(R. 3) •

Officer Pidcock then shifted his at·

tention to John Payne, informed John that he was under arrest
and wrestled him to the ground where he handcuffed the boy.
(R. 4) .

During this time Officer Bowcutt had succeeded in

handcuffing Scott Payne.

Officer Bowcutt then took Scott

Payne into custody and Officer Pidcock took John into his

- 2 -
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made the required referral to the Ogden police department,
and John was subsequently released to his mother.

(R.

4).

On January 21, 1977, John Payne was charged in the
weber County Juvenile Court as follows:
"On or about the 31st day of December, 1976,
John Payne did obstruct justice in that he did,
with the intent to hinder, prevent or delay the
apprehension of another for the commission of a
crime, obstruct by force or intimidation a police
officer from performing an act which might aid in
the apprehension of such person."
(Tr. 9)
A hearing was held in the Juvenile Court and on March 2, 1977,
the Court issued its Findings of Fact and Decree as follows:
"The allegations contained in the petition
are found to be as follows:
True. The Court finds
that the crime that was being committed was the assault on Officer Bowcutt by Scott Payne. The Court
finds that Officer Pidcock did have the right to
intervene and that John obstructed justice by interfering with him."
(Tr. 10)
The Court ordered the juvenile to pay a fine of $25.00
or work for a subdivision of government for a total of 12-1/2
hours.

(Tr. 10).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A
FINDING THAT THE JUVENILE WAS GUILTY
OF OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE.
Appellant alleges that the following finding of

fact by the Juvenile Court was contrary to the weight of
the evidence:
"The court finds that the crime that was
being committed was the assault of Offic~r Bow~utt
by Scott Payne. The court finds that Officer Pidcock did have the right to intervene and that
John obstructed justice by interfering with him."
(R 10) •
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Appellant further alleges that "there was no evidence adduce:
at the hearing that:

(1) . • .

Officer [Bowcutt] was in the

lawful performance of his duties;

(2)

. . . [he] was apprehen

ing another for the commission of a crime;
been committed;

(4)

(3)

any crime haG

. . . [he] was acting lawfully."

(Appel-

lant's Brief p. 5)
Although appellant would make much out of the paucity
of evidence regarding the actions taken by Officer Bowcutt a:
the fact that neither he (Bowcutt) nor Scott Payne testified
at the hearing, the question whether "There was • • • sufficient evidence for the court to determine if an assault was
or was not occurring"

(Appellant's Brief, p. 6) against Offi1

Bowcutt by Scott Payne is largely irrelevant.

Practically

speaking, since Scott Payne was not the defendant below, the
question is not whether Scott committed an assault upon Offi1
Bowcutt, but whether the evidence produced in the hearing wa'
sufficient to support the Juvenile Court's finding that defe:
ant, John Payne, obstructed justice by interfering with Offi1
Pidcock.
It seems obvious that appellant has made a fundamenta.
error in analyzing the facts and the findings.

The Court

did not find that Scott Payne was assaulting Officer Pidcock
as stated on page 5 of appellant's brief.

Nor was the Juve·

nile Court's jurisdiction imposed because Scott Payne was
assaulting Officer Bowcutt as suggested by appellant on page
of his brief.

The finding was that John Payne, the juvenile
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was interfering with Officer Pidcock, and Juvenile Court
jurisdiction over John Payne, a juvenile, was predicated on
the juvenile's acts, not the acts of Scott Payne.

John was

on trial in tre Juvenile Court for his acts in relation to
Officer Pidcock.

Scott was not on trial nor was his relation-

ship with Officer Bowcutt necessarily pertinent, except that
the scuffle which was taking place furnished justification
for interference by Officer Pidcock.
Appellant cites the case of State of Utah v. Richard
Allen Bradshaw, Utah 541 P. 2d 200 (1975) in support of his
argument that the commission of a crime must first be established before one can be found

g~ilty

ing with an arrest for said crime.
State v. Bradshaw held that

th~

of unlawfully interfer-

(Appellant's brief, Pp.6-7).

provisions of Section 76-8-305,

"Interference in arrest by law enforcement official,"
unconstitutional.

were

The juvenile in our instant case was not

charged under the provisions of Section 76-8-305.

He was

not charged with intentionally interfering with an arrest.
Appellant seems to feel that whether or not a lawful arrest
was taking place is dispositive of this case.
Conclusion, Brief p. 8).
irrelevant.

(Appellant's

Actually, this consideration is

The juvenile was charged under the provisions

of Section 76-8-306, obstructing justice, not Section 76-8-305.
The elements of the "Obstructing" statute require that a person,
with intent to prevent the apprehension of another for the
commission of a crime, obstructs by force anyone from performing Sponsored
an act
which
might
aid
in the
apprehension
of Services
such
by the S.J.
Quinney Law
Library. Funding
for digitization
provided by
the Institute of Museum and Library
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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person.

In the instant case the Juvenile Court Judge found,

with ample evidence, that Scott Payne was
against the person of Officer Bowcutt.

com.~itting

a crime

He further found

that defendant John Payne was obstructing Officer Pidcock
in apprehending Scott.

Certainly, all the elements of the

obstructing charge have been met.
The offense of obstructing justice is set forth
in Utah Code Annotated §76-8-306:
"A person is guilty of an offense if, with
intent to hinder, orevent, or delay the discovery,
apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another for the commission of a crime, he:
(a)
Knowing an offense has been committed,
conceals it from a magistrate; or
(b)

Harbors or conceals the offender; or

( c)
Provides the offender a weapon, transportation, disguise, or other means for avoiding discovery or apprehension; or

(d) Warns such offender of impending discovery or apprehension; or
(e)
Conceals, destroys, or alters any physical
evidence that might aid in the discovery, apprehension, or conviction of such person; or
(f)
Obstructs by force, intimidation, or deception anyone from performing an act which might
aid in the discovery, apprehension, prosecution or
conviction of such person.
·(Emphasis added)
The facts of the instant case demonstrate that the
defendant, John Payne, did intentionally obstruct Officer
Pidcock by force from performing an act which might have ail
in the apprehension of another for the commission of a crime
As testified to at the hearing, Officer Pidcock was on auey
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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and in uniform at the time of the incident.

Since Officer

Bowcutt was also in uniform and was attempting to perform a
police function, i.e., impound a vehicle, it would seem that
the court justifiably presumed that both officers were acting in performance of their duties.

From his patrol car across

the street, Officer Pidcock was able to observe Officer Bowcutt
and Scott Payne.

After the scuffle began, Officer Bowcutt

called for assistance from Officer Pidcock.

Under the cir-

curristances, there can be little doubt that Officer Pidcock was
justified in coming to the aid of his fellow officer.
The powers and duties of police officers are described
in Utah Code Annotated, §10-6-66, as follows:
"10-6-66. Police officers--Powers and duties.-All police officers of any city shall possess the powers conferred upon constables by law. It shall be the
duty of the police force in any city at all times to
preserve the public peace, prevent crime, detect and
arrest offenders, suppress riots, protect persons and
property, remove nuisances existing in the public
streets, roads and highways, enforce every law relating to the suppression of offenses, and perform all
duties enJoined upon them by ordinance."
(Emphasis added.)
In executing the above powers and duties, police officers
must necessarily assist one another.

The hazardous nature of

police work requires a high degree of teamwork and cooperation-indeed, the rendering of assistance to a fellow officer would
appear to be mandatory.

The mere possibility that Officer

Bowcutt may in some way have acted improperly pursuant to an
impoundment is immaterial absent some egregious and obvious

-

7 -
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abuse on his part at the time of the incident.

Police

officers must act quickly and rarely have the luxury of
meditation and certain knowledge.

To require proof that

a prior crime has been committed before an assisting officer
can be considered to be acting within the scope of his duty
would undermine trust between police officers and impede
effective law enforcement.

Again, the real question is wheth·

er defendant obstructed Officer Pidcock in the performance
of his lawful duty.
In the case of State v. Hinsley, Utah, 501 P. 2d 111
(1972) this Court quoted with approval the test for an obstruction charge as set out in State v. Sandman, Utah,
P. 2d 1060 (1955).

The test is that i t must appear that

(A) a duly constituted public officer,
performance of his official duty,
sisted by defendant.

286

(B) engaged in the

(C) was obstructed or re-

In the instant case a duly constituted

public officer (Officer Pidcock) , engaged in the performance
of his official duty (assisting a fellow officer in

apprehe~

ing a suspect) was obstructed by the defendant (interference
by John Payne). The offense has clearly been established
and the uncontroverted evidence supports the finding of
guilt based on this test.

That defendant did obstruct Offr

cer Pidcock while in the performance of his duty is clearly
supported by Officer Pidcock's testimony:

II

• John came

up from my left side and grabbed me, causing me to release
my grasp on Scott's arm.

* * *

I turned around not knowing

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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whether he was going to strike a blow at me, or what was
going to happen at that time."
5g Arn

(R. 3) .

As stated in

Jur 2d 868, §19:
"Where a person by words or conduct interferes in behalf of another person who is in----crrfficulty with an officer, the offense of obstructing
an officer will be held committed where either actual force is used or a threat is made, coupled with
the present ability and apparent intention to execute it."
(Emphasis added).

There would appear to be no excuse for John's behavior.

He

knew he was interfering with a police officer in performance
of his duty; and, it is highly unlikely that his interference
was anything but intentional.
While true that "Any unlawful interference with
the fundamental right of personal liberty may be resisted",
5 Am Jur 2d 778, i t would appear that the right of a third
person to intervene on behalf of another is quite restricted.
In State v. Browers, 356 Mo. 1195, 205 S. W. 2d 721 (1947),
for example, defendant attacked a marshal, after the marshal
shot at defendant's brother, to prevent him from killing his
brother.

The court held that defendant had acted lawfully

to prevent an illegal arrest and could use only such force as
was reasonably necessary to repel an assault on his brother.
Respondent does not dispute that some circumstances may
justify third party interference.

Justice Henriod stated

in his concurring opinion to State v. Bradshaw, Utah 541 P. 2d
BOO

(1975):
- 9 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"Consider also, the case where an over-anxious, eager officer obviously is using aggressive force to subdue a teenager to the point
where bystanders honestly believe he is about
to kill him, or where a drunken officer with a
badge is arresting and beating a perfectly innocent citizen, or where a cop at a football
stadium goes berserk and at the point of a gun
attempts to arrest everyone in front of him,
or a game warden, in a remote wilderness area,
out of sheer suspicion manhandles a hunter
minding his own business, or an off-duty law
enforcement officer in civilian clothes, not
·~ecognized" as a Bobbie, tries to arrest his
neighbor on a trumped-up charge . .
(Emphasis added) .
But note that obstruction by third parties can be justified
only when the person interfered with is overzealous, acting
clearly illegally and/or with excessive use of force.

The

instant case contains no such extenuating circumstances.
To hold obstruction justifiable in other than extreme cases
could serve only to impede effective law enforcement and
encourage unwarranted interference with police officers.
POINT II
THE JUVEUILE COURT HAD APPROPRIATE JURISDICTION OVER THE RESPONDENT.
Appellant states that the lower court abused its
discretion by taking jurisdiction over the subject minor;
however, if John, a minor, did in fact violate §76-8-306,
respondent fails to see any reason for improper

jurisdictio~.

under §78-3-16:

- 10 -
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"Jurisdiction of juvenile court--Judge
may sit as district court judge.--Exceut as otherwise provided by law, the court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings:
(1)
Concerning any child who has violated any
federal, state, or local law or municipal ordinance,
or any person under twenty-one years of age who
has violated any such law or ordinance before becoming eighteen years of age, .regardless of where the
violation occurred."
(Emphasis Added).
POINT III
THE FINDINGS OF THE JUVENILE COURT MUST
BE GIVEN DEFERENCE UNLESS CLEARLY AGAINST
THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
The appellant must clearly show that the lower court
erred.

In the case of State in the Interest of K--B--,

326 P. 2d 395, 7 Utah 2d 398 (1958), this Court reaffirmed
the great

deference which must be given to findings of

the trial court.

It stated:

"In approaching appellant's contention that
the evidence does not justify the order made, it
is well to have in mind the basic rules applicable to this review. The statute provides that
appeals from the juvenile court shall be, 'in the
same manner * * * as * * * appeals from judgments
***of the district court**.' Hearings in the
juvenile court involving questions as to the custody of children are equitable. Due to the extreme concern of courts for the welfare of children,
proceedings in their interest are sometimes stated
to be equitable in the highest degree, because the
most careful consideration will be given such
matters.
In equity proceedings we are charged with
the responsibility of reviewing the evidence; and
it is the established rule that we will not disturb
the findings and determination made unless they
are clearly against the weight of the evidence, or
the court has abused its discretion."
(Emphasis Added)
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Respondent respectfully submits that the evidence as
argued under Point I was more than sufficient to support
the verdict rendered in the trial Court.

The only evidence

was that submitted by the State, which certainly established
that the juvenile had deliberately and unlawfully obstructed
the administration of justice.
CONCLUSION
Because there were no extenuating circumstances which
would justify defendant's interference with Officer Pidcock's
performance of his duty, the Juvenile Court acted properly
in finding defendant guilty of obstructing justice.

Respond·

ent thus seeks to have the action of the Juvenile Court affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Robert B. Hansen
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Franklyn B. Matheson
Assistant Attorney Genera
Attorneys for Responc

-12 -
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